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Abstract
Using ﬁrm-level panel data from the German cost structure survey over the period 1992
to 2000, our empirical analysis shows that ﬁrms that increased material inputs relative to
internal labor costsperformedbetterin termsof grossoperatingsurplusthan otherﬁrms.
However, ﬁrms that increased external services relative to internal labor costs, thus out-
sourcing service functions previously provided within the ﬁrm, performed worse. In
sum, our ﬁndings support the view that ﬁrms tend to overestimate the beneﬁts accruing
from outsourcing of services previously provided internally.
JEL classiﬁcation numbers: L22, L23, L60
Keywords: Outsourcing, Firm Performance, Business Service Sector.
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Throughout the 1990s a remarkable increase of outsourcing activities by ﬁrms
has been observed. It has been hypothesized that this increase results from the
decline in transaction costs in connection with the intensiﬁed use of information
technology (Abraham and Taylor, 1996; Groot, 2001). It has also been argued that
part of the process of deindustralization is associated with outsourcing. Today,
activities that used to be performed in-house (e.g. auditing, maintenance, repair,
transportation, janitorial and legal services) are usually outsourced to ﬁrms in
the business service sector. Consequently, outsourcing has contributed signiﬁ-
cantly to the growth of business-related services during the last decade (Fixler
and Siegel, 1999). Moreover, manufacturing ﬁrms are outsourcing not only ser-
vices but also internal production. One prominent example is the automotive
industry, where some large car manufacturers only perform the ﬁnal assemblage
of major parts whose production is outsourced to external suppliers. Since this
type of outsourcing quite often occurs at an international level, it is also closely
entwined with the globalization process (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996).
This study is an empirical contribution to the literature on factors that de-
termine ﬁrm performance. In particular, we test whether outsourcing is an im-
portant determinant for a ﬁrm’s proﬁtability. In addition, our paperalso provides
estimates on therelative importance of ﬁrm-, market- (i.e.industry-) andlocation-
speciﬁc effects, as well as on the impact of organizational structure and human
capital input on ﬁrm performance.
In general, outsourcing can be related to make-or-buy decisions on intermedi-
ategoods, tothe hiringoftemporary labor, andto theuseofexternal services. The
term outsourcing is used here to describe all the subcontracting relationships be-
tween ﬁrms, and the hiring of external workers. We presume that ﬁrms engage in
outsourcing activities because they expect a positive impact on ﬁrm performance
by saving resources in terms of both labor and capital. If for instance interme-
diate goods are not longer internally produced but purchased from an external
supplier, this leads to a reduction of both labor costs and capital investments. In
the absence of transaction costs, a ﬁrm will decide to outsource when the mar-
1ket price for an outsourced activity is lower than internal marginal cost for that
activity (Fixler and Siegel, 1999).
However, it is an unresolved empirical issue whether outsourcing actually
has a positive inﬂuence on a ﬁrm’s performance as is expected a priori. Some
case studies have reported that ﬁrms tend to underestimate the transaction costs
associated with outsourcing. For instance, it has been documented that some
ﬁrm have again ‘insourced’ activities that were previously performed by exter-
nal ﬁrms, because they were dissatisﬁed with the quality or because they have
underestimated the amount of asset speciﬁc investments (Benson, 1999; Gornig
and Ring, 2000; Young and Macneil, 2000). A few studies have analysed the im-
pact of outsourcing on ﬁrm efﬁciency (for an overview see Heshmati, 2002). Al-
though efﬁciency is certainly an important aspect of ﬁrm performance, it neglects
the product market performance of ﬁrms. Taking this into account, our study is
a novelty to the literature. For instance, even if efﬁciency of ﬁrms remains un-
changed after outsourcing of internal production, higher quality of intermediate
inputs might result in higher quality of ﬁnal products and hence higher sales and
higher margins. The lack of empirical studies on the link between outsourcing
and ﬁrm performance might be also due to a limited availability of suitable mi-
cro data for analysing this subject.
Our study is based on a representative panel data set of about 43,000 German
manufacturing ﬁrms from the German cost structure survey over the period 1992
to 2000. As an indicator for ﬁrm performance we use Gross Operating Surplus
(GOS). We employ several measures for outsourcing activities of ﬁrms. We ﬁnd
that in particular outsourcing of internal production has a signiﬁcant positive im-
pact on ﬁrm performance in both the short and the long run, whereas outsourc-
ing of services appears to have a negative impact in the short run but a positive
impact in the long run. Besides this, our ﬁndings emphasize the importance of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics for explaining differences in ﬁrm performance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
empirical evidence and the hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the empirical ap-
proach. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
22 Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence
In theory, efﬁcient ﬁrms will allocate their resources within the value chain to
those activities that give them a comparative advantage (Shank and Govindara-
jan, 1992). Other activities that do not offer such advantages will be outsourced to
external suppliers. When ﬁrms engage in outsourcing, they assess the productiv-
ity of their in-house service functions and decide to outsource if others can pro-
vide comparable services cheaper. Basically, when ﬁrms outsource activities and
functions related to producing their products and services, they move towards a
business strategy based on ‘core competencies’, a set of ‘skills and knowledge’
that helps maintain their competitive advantage in serving customers (Porter,
1985; Sharpe, 1997). Thus outsourcing is expected to imply cost savings rela-
tive to internal production or internal service functions. This will be the case if
outside suppliers beneﬁt from specialized knowledge and/or economies of scale
(Heshmati, 2002).
However, recentworkbyGrossman andHelpman(2002)showsthatthechoice
between continued internal production or an outsourcing decision means taking
into consideration more than just production cost differences. According to trans-
action cost economics, outsourcing is desirable only when transaction costs in-
curring from asset speciﬁcity, incomplete contracting and search efforts are lower
than the production cost advantage (Williamson, 1971). In addition, the attrac-
tiveness of outsourcing to a certain producer may well depend on how many
ﬁrms can potentially provide the inputs it needs. As mentioned above, some
case studies have also reported that beneﬁts from outsourcing are quite often not
derived immediately and that managers tend to overestimate the resulting bene-
ﬁts and underestimate the involved transaction costs (Benson, 1999; Gornig and
Ring, 2000; Young and Macneil, 2000).
Furthermore, if ﬁrms improve efﬁciency by outsourcing it can be expected
that other ﬁrms will do the same. Therefore, a competitive advantage that results
from outsourcing activitiescanbe expectedtodiminishin thelongrun sinceother
ﬁrms are likely to adopt the same strategy as well.
Table 1 shows the means (medians) and the respective developments of two
3performance variables for (all) West German ﬁrms over the period 1992 to 2000.
Return on sales (ROS) decreased by about eight percent over the period whereas
return per employee (RPE) increased by about 22 percent from 1992 to 2000.
Looking atthe three outsourcing indicators inTable 1, we seethatthe share of ma-
terial inputs in gross production increased about ﬁve percent in this period, while
labor costs as a share of gross production decreased about three percent. More-
over, a strong increase of about 27 percent in external contract work, i.e. farming
out of internal production, and also a signiﬁcant increase of about 14 percent in
external services can be observed.
Table 2 contains the same descriptive information for the subsample large
West German ﬁrms. In contrast to all ﬁrms, for large ﬁrms the median of ROS
increased about 26 percent from 1992 to 2000 and RPE more than doubled. Thus,
large ﬁrms have improved their performance signiﬁcantly. On the other hand,
labor costs as a share of gross production decreased by 18 percent, whereas mate-
rial inputs increased bysix percent and external contract work increased by about
eight percent.
From this evidence we infer that among large ﬁrms in particular there has
been a strong tendency toward reduction of internal labor costs and an increase
in material inputs and external contract work throughout the 1990s. Simulta-
neously, we observe that the performance median has improved signiﬁcantly.
Consequently, we hypothezise that there is a link between outsourcing and a
ﬁrm’s performance. Outsourcing activities should lead to increased ﬁrm efﬁ-
ciency and/or to an increased competitive advantage, thereby increasing a ﬁrm’s
proﬁts.
Our approach also controls for other factors that might exert an inﬂuence on
ﬁrm performance. Many studies have reported the importance of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
effects in explaining ﬁrm performance (Brenner, Bunke, Droge and Schwalbach,
2001). Hence, unobserved heterogeneity across ﬁrms, for example, in terms of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics and managerial abilities, is likely to be important for
explaining ﬁrm performance. Another strand of literature emphasizes the role
of intangible assets, e.g. human capital or technological knowledge, for ﬁrms
4(Kleinknecht and Mohnen, 2002; Webster, 1999). Firms with human-capital inten-
sive production should perform better and have higher proﬁts than ﬁrms with a
low human-capital intensity. In addition,t h ei n d u s t r i a lo r g a nization literature
traditionally discusses the relevance of product market competition for ﬁrm per-
formance (Martin, 1993). Accordingly, we can expect that product market effects
are important for explaining ﬁrm performance. On the other hand, the empirical
evidence on the relationship between market concentration rate and ﬁrm perfor-
mance is ambiguous (Schmalensee, 1989, p. 976).
Regarding the relationship between ﬁrm size and performance, there should
be a trade-off between economies of scale on the one hand and increasing inef-
ﬁciency on the other. Since outsourcing often implies the shift of internal pro-
duction activities from large to external medium scale producers, e.g. in the
automobile industry, it can be hypothesized that there is an optimal ﬁrm size
for any given production activity and that the relation between size and perfor-
mance in terms of efﬁciency is non-linear. Accordingly, ﬁrms which are smaller
than optimal and ﬁrms which are larger than optimal should perform worse than
optimally sized ﬁrms.
Firmsthatproduce withahighcapitalintensitycanbeexpectedtohavehigher
(gross) proﬁts because they have to re-earn their capital investments. Even more
important, they also have to ﬁnance their current and future capital investments
out of gross proﬁts. Finally, ﬁrm proﬁts should be positively related to the num-




Gross Operating Surplus (GOS) of ﬁrm i in period t is deﬁned as
GOSit = Sit − Cit,
where Sit denotes gross production and Cit denotes production costs. We assume
that GOSit is a function of the cost structure of production (i.e. intensity of out-
5sourcing), of the human capital input, the organization of the ﬁrm and market-,
regional as well as unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics. Thus, we have
GOS = f(production process, outsourcing, organizational structure,
product market, location, unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics,
unobserved time effects)+error. (1)
Return on capital would be a suitable indicator for describing ﬁrm performance.
However, since capital stock data is not available we employ two different rel-
ative measures of ﬁrm performance in the empirical analysis. The ﬁrst is as
GOSit/Lit, which can be labelled as return per employee (RPE). It is worth pointing
out that this measure possesses similarities to measures of labour productivity,
since GOSit/Lit is derived from gross value added at factor costs (i.e. before de-
preciation) minus wages and salaries. However, while labor productivity is a
purely input/output related measure, RPE also captures the market outcome of
the output.
The second measure of ﬁrm performance is GOSit/Sit, which we label as re-
turn on sales (ROS). If average costs are taken as a proxy for marginal costs, then
this measure may reﬂect the markup (p − c )/p, which is used in the Industrial
Organization literature as a measure of a ﬁrm’s market power. For this reason,
we interpret this measure as an indicator of a ﬁrm’s product market performance.
3.2 Variable Deﬁnition
Table 3 gives the names and provides deﬁnitions of the variables we use in the
regression equation.1 Firms’ GOS at factor costs before depreciation have been
derived from
GOS =gross production-total intermediate consumption-wages & salaries,
1 For further details on the deﬁnition of variables, we refer the reader to the original series
“Kostenstrukturerhebung”, annual publication of the Federal German Statistical Ofﬁce.
6where
total intermediate consumption=material+energy+traded goods
+external contract work+external repair services
+rents & leasing+other costs.
We measure ﬁrms’ outsourcing activities using three variables. All of these vari-
ables are expressed relative to internal labor costs in order to reﬂect substitution
between internal labor and outsourcing costs. The ﬁrst outsourcing variable is
material inputs. This variable reﬂects the make-or-buy decisions of ﬁrms. If
ﬁrms decide to outsource internal production to external suppliers, we can ex-
pect to observe an increase in material inputs relative to internal labor costs.2
The second outsourcing variable is external contract work, which mainly consists
of farming out internal production. Accordingly, this measure reﬂects subcon-
tracting between ﬁrms, where ﬁrms transfer their intermediate products to other
ﬁrms for further processing. The third variable for outsourcing is based on the
category other costs not related to production, which is used as a collective item
in the cost structure survey. As such, it includes many externally provided ser-
vices e.g. transportation, consultancy, external advertising agency costs, external
audit services, cleansing, janitorial services, etc. However, a caveat applies here
because this also includes a few categories of costs, e.g. bank fees, which are not
related to outsourcing of internal services.
We stress that it is important to capture differences in the production process
across ﬁrms in the analysis. Accordingly, we use four variables to describe the
production process of a ﬁrm. All of these variables are divided by the corre-
sponding employment ﬁgures.
The ﬁrst variable we use is rents and leasing. It is used as a measure for the
external user costs of capital services. The second variable we employ is capital
labour intensity. This captures the internal user cost of capital services. In the
literature, the internal user cost of capital services is commonly measured by a
2 As an alternative indicator it would be possible deﬁne material input relative to user costs
of capital services because ﬁrms will also save capital costs if material inputs are produced by
external suppliers.
7composite indicator using the depreciation rate, the price for investment goods
and the interest rate (Jorgenson, 1963). Since we are interested in the relative user
cost of capital services across ﬁrms, the most important ﬁrm-speciﬁc component
ofthe internalusercost ofcapitalservices isdepreciation. Weuse taxdepreciation
per person engaged, which we label as capital intensity. Tax depreciation rates
are presumably higher than economic depreciation rates. However, since this is
valid for all ﬁrms, we expect that the structure of tax depreciation across ﬁrms
is correlated with the unobservable economic depreciation. The third variable is
energy consumption. Note that this measure is also used for capturing varying
degrees of capacity utilization of production over time. The fourth variable is the
wage level, which is total wages and salaries plus the employer’s contribution to
social insurances divided by the number of persons employed. The wage level is
interpreted as a measure of the human capital intensity of production.
We employ several variables to control for the organizational characteristics
of a ﬁrm. One measure is ﬁrm size, which is the number of persons engaged.
T h es e c o n dv a r i a b l ei sa ni n d i c a t o rf o rt he legal form of business organization.
It distinguishes between corporate and non-corporate ﬁrms. We also include a
variable indicating whether a ﬁrm belongs to skilled trades or manufacturing.
Finally, the number of owners engaged in the ﬁrm is also included.
Regarding product market effects on ﬁrm performance, we use three different
indicators. First, an indicator variable at the four-digit level for the industry in
which a ﬁrm operates is included. Note that due to a change of industry clas-
siﬁcation in 1995 we have estimated the industry assignment of each individual
ﬁrm before 1995 using a transition matrix. The industry assignment of a ﬁrm is
almost time-invariant, so that the statistical mode of reported industry assign-
ment is used for each ﬁrm. Furthermore, concentrations on product markets are
measured with the Herﬁndahl index. Note that only domestic concentration is
captured by this measure. Furthermore, we use the market share of a ﬁrm in total
industry turnover as a proxy for the market power.
We also test whether ﬁrm performance is related to locational effects. For this
reason, indicators for nine types of regions are included in the equation. This
8indicator describes the degree of agglomeration of regions. Table 4 describes the
structure of our unbalanced panel data set. Firms with only one observation are
included in the between-ﬁrm analysis but are excluded in the within-ﬁrm analy-
sis.
4 Estimation Results
Our estimation strategy consists of two parts. First, we perform a between-ﬁrm
analysis where all observations are averaged for each ﬁrm. Thisapproach enables
us to estimate the relative importance of time-invariant variables, e.g. market, lo-
cational and organizational effects. In addition, we interpret the coefﬁcients from
this between-ﬁrm analysis as estimates of the long run parameters. Second, we
perform a within-ﬁrm analysis where ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects are included in order
to capture unobserved heterogeneity across ﬁrms. Here, all time-invariant and
nearly time-invariant variables, e.g. industry, legal form and number of owners,
are excluded. We interpret the coefﬁcients from the within-ﬁrm estimation as es-
timates of the short run effects. The estimation method both for the between-ﬁrm
approach and the within-ﬁrm approach is Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA).
As a result of the large number of observations, almost all included effects
turn out to be signiﬁcant even at a 1 percent level. Therefore, two rules of thumb
are used to distinguish the more important and robust variables from less im-
portant and less robust ones.3 First, a variable is considered to be important if its
partial R2, i.e. the partial contribution of this variable to explainingthe overall R2,
is larger than 0.005 in the between-ﬁrm analysis and 0.001 in the within-ﬁrm anal-
ysis. Note, that the partial R2 is the change in total R2 if the variable is removed
from the model given all other variables. It is worth pointing out, however, that
a relative low partial R2 – in particular if the corresponding F−statistic is signif-
icant – does not imply that a variable is not important for the analysis. Such a
variable might be important because if it is correlated with other variables, then
estimates of the other effects will be biased if the variable is excluded. A low par-
3 This includes both continuous and qualitative variables, which are also labelled as class vari-
ables or effects.
9tial R2 is interpreted in this context as evidence that the variable contributes little
to explaining ﬁrm performance independently of the other variables given.
The second assessment criteria is whether, for continuous variables, an esti-
mated effect is robust both in terms of sign and signiﬁcance when rank transfor-
mations of all continuous variables are performed and the ANCOVA estimation
is repeated (Conover and Iman, 1982). If both the sign and signiﬁcance remain af-
ter rank transformation, an effect is considered to be robust. Note that regressions
based on rank transformed variables do not measure linear but monotone rela-
tionships (Imanand Conover, 1979). Also, regressions based on rank transformed
variables are less sensitive to inﬂuential outliers.
Finally, we have trimmed the distributions of the two dependent variables
with large tails at the lower and upper 1 percent quantiles in order to remove
inﬂuential observations from the analysis.
Table 5 contains the partial R2s and Table 6 the estimated elasticities at mean
data points for the continuous variables for the between-ﬁrm analysis. The total
R2 for the respective dependent variables RPE and ROS are 0.35 and 0.21 respec-
tively, which is a satisfactory ﬁt for a cross-sectional estimation. For RPE, we ﬁnd
that year, industry, capital intensity, wage level and material inputs are impor-
tant explanatory variables. For ROS, we ﬁnd that YEAR, EAST/WEST dummy
interacted with YEAR, capital intensity and wage level are important. Industry
effects are important as well, in particular for ROS. We also ﬁnd that wage level
has a positive effect on RPE, and thus has a positive impact on ﬁrm efﬁciency, but
a negative impact on ROS. Since ROS proxies the markup of a ﬁrm, any increase
in input prices will lower the markup and thus the proﬁt margin. Material inputs
relative to labour costs have a positive impact on RPE. Accordingly, ﬁrms can im-
prove their efﬁciency by outsourcing internal production to external suppliers.
Year effects are particularly important for ROS. Note that in the between-ﬁrm
analysis, the effect YEAR is deﬁned as the average (rounded) observation year
for a ﬁrm.
Although the associated partial R2s are lower than 0.005, we ﬁnd that a ﬁrm’s
market share has a positive effect both on RPE and ROS. Another conclusion to
10be drawn from the between-ﬁrm analysis is that size is not a particularly impor-
tant explanatory variable of ﬁrm performance. It is worth noting, however, that
in general small ﬁrms tend to perform better in terms of both RPE and ROS than
large ﬁrms. The negative coefﬁcient for SIZE∗SIZE implies a u-shaped relation-
ship between size and ﬁrm performance.
Table 7 displays the results from the within-ﬁrm estimation and Table 8 con-
tains the estimated elasticities for continuous variables at the mean data points.
Asmentioned above, we stress that the within-ﬁrm estimation gives the short run
effects of variables, whereas the between-ﬁrm estimation reﬂects the long run im-
pact of variables. Time-invariant variables, e.g. industry and location, and also
nearly time-invariant variables, e.g. size, are not included in the within-ﬁrm anal-
ysis. However, as a measure of business cycles at the industry level, the growth
of industry-wide turnover is additionally included.
We ﬁnd that particularly ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects, which are interpreted as unob-
served ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, e.g. product knowledge and/or managerial
abilities, are very important for explaining ﬁrm performance. Almost half of the
variation in performance across ﬁrms can be explained by ﬁrm-speciﬁc charac-
teristics, and this is even stronger for ROS than for RPE. These results also imply
that ﬁrm performance appears to be quite persistent over time, since ﬁrm-speciﬁc
and time-invariant inﬂuences could not otherwise matter for ﬁrm performance.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that material inputs have a positive impact on RPE, while
external services have a negative impact on ROS. The coefﬁcient for external con-
tract work is positive and signiﬁcant for RPE, but turns out not to be robust.
Similar to the between-ﬁrm estimation, wage level has a positive impact on
RPE, but a negative impact on ROS. This implies that on the one hand, ﬁrms
with human-capital intensive production are more efﬁcient than other ﬁrms, but
that an increase in the price of labour leads to a reduction of the ﬁrm’s mark-up
and proﬁt margin. Interestingly, the elasticity of efﬁciency (RPE) with respect to
the wage level is smaller in the short run than in the long run. In contrast, the
elasticity of RPE with respect to material inputs is larger in the short run than
in the long run. Thus, positive effects from this type of outsourcing appear to
11diminish in the long run.
Asexpected, capitalintensity is a veryimportant explanatory variable for ﬁrm
performance. Business cycles effects from the aggregate economy which would
be captured by the set of year dummies appear to have rather small effects both
for RPE and ROS. In this context we ﬁnd that energy consumption is positively
related to performance in the within-ﬁrm analysis, and thus it captures the effects
of business cycles and different degrees of capacity utilization. We also ﬁnd that,
albeit with a low partial R2, growth of industry-wide turnover has a positive
impact on ﬁrm performance.
Finally, location effects are signiﬁcant but not very important for explaining
ﬁrm performance. Firms in agglomerated regions have a higher expected per-
formance than ﬁrms in rural areas. Also, the EAST/WEST location effect turns
out to be signiﬁcant. However, interaction with year dummies shows that the
difference in performance almost disappears over the period 1992 to 2000.
5 Conclusions
The early 1990s have witnessed a remarkable increase in outsourcing activities.
The starting hypothesis of this study was that ﬁrms pursue an outsourcing strat-
egy in order to improve their performance. From the perspective of the ﬁrm,
the rationale for outsourcing is to save internal resources either in terms of la-
bor costs or capital investments or both. Outsourcing activities have many facets,
e.g. cleaning, janitorial, transportation services or intermediate production. Our
study provides estimates of the importance of three different types of outsourc-
ing activities. The ﬁrst type is increasing intermediate material inputs relative to
internal labor costs, which reﬂects the make-or-buy decision of ﬁrms. The second
type is farming out production, which subsumes subcontracting between ﬁrms.
The third type is external services, e.g. consultancy or auditing.
The general result is that in the long run, all three types of outsourcing activi-
ties have a positive impact on return per employee (RPE), which we interpret as
a measure of ﬁrm efﬁciency. Conversely, this does not necessarily imply higher
proﬁt marginsforﬁrmseitherintheshort run orinthelongrun. Onthe onehand,
12ﬁrms that have increased their material inputs relative to labor costs performed
better than ﬁrms that did not. On the other hand, ﬁrms which have farmed out
internal production or used external services are more efﬁcient but have lower
proﬁt margins as a result of outsourcing. These ﬁndings suggest that ﬁrms have
overengaged in these two latter types of outsourcing, and thus on average these
types of outsourcing are above the optimal level.
In sum, our analysis supports the view that ﬁrms tend to overestimate the
beneﬁts accruing from outsourcing of external services and/or underestimate the
associated transaction costs. A prerequisite for successful outsourcing activities
is that markets for intermediate inputs really function. Our results suggest that
this is the case for material inputs, but not for external services. One reason could
be that it is easier for ﬁrms to monitor quality of intermediate products than to
monitor the quality of services. As noted by Williamson (1971), if market do not
function, then vertical integration will used by ﬁrms as a substitute for markets
organization. Also, ﬁrms might not fully anticipate the search costs of ﬁnding a
suitable partner that can provide the service functions required.
We have also analyzed other factors that determine ﬁrm performance. For in-
stance, we ﬁnd that the wage level, which we interpret as human capital intensity
of production, has a positive impact on efﬁciency particularly in the long run, but
has a negative impact on the markup of a ﬁrm. This is not unexpected, since the
markup corresponds to the difference between output and input prices, such that
any increase in input prices will lower the markup.
Another central conclusion of our study is that unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc char-
acteristics, which presumably comprise technological knowledge, marketing or
managerial abilities, are very important factors for explaining ﬁrm performance.
These ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors turn out to be much more important than industry and
location effects together. This ﬁnding also suggests that ﬁrm performance is quite
persistent. Finally, ﬁrm size is not a particularly relevant variable for explaining
differencesinperformance. The estimatessuggest, however, thatsmallﬁrmstend
to perform better than large ﬁrms.
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17Tab. 3: Names and Deﬁnitions of Variables
Name Deﬁnition
Dependent variables:
Return gross operating surplus
per employee (RPE) / number of employed persons1
on sales (ROS) / gross production
Costs and production indicators:
CAPITAL INTENSITY depreciation / number of employed persons1
RENTS & LEASING rents & leasing expenses
/ number of employed persons1
ENERGY CONSUMPTION energy costs / number of employed persons1
WAGE LEVEL wages & salaries / number of employed persons
Outsourcing indicators:
MATERIAL INPUTS material inputs / labor costs
EXTERNAL CONTRACT WORK external contract work / labor costs
EXTERNAL SERVICES external service costs / labor costs
Market indicators:
MARKET SHARE turnover of ﬁrm / industry turnover
CONCENTRATION Herﬁndahl index
INDUSTRY industry indicator 4-digit level
Organizational factors:
SIZE number of employed persons
LEGAL FORM OF BUSINESS non-corporate or corporate company
NUMBER OF OWNERS number of owners working in the ﬁrm
CRAFT / MANUFACTURING dummy variable
Locational effects:
TYPE OF REGION nine different types of regions
1 including owners working in the ﬁrm
18Tab. 4: Structure of the Unbalanced Panel
Obs. Periods 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total
No. of Firms
All ﬁrms 4848 14505 5517 6367 5269 1426 2473 318 2287 43010
East 2955 12225 4096 5603 4395 1180 2001 267 2108 34830
West 1893 2280 1421 764 874 246 472 51 179 8180
19Tab. 5: Partial R-Squares from Between-ﬁrms estimations
Dependent Variable:
Return per Return on
employee (RPE) sales (ROS)
DF Part. R2 Notes Part. R2 Notes
Cost and Production 4
CAPITAL INTENSITY 1 .0656 +,s,r .0335 +,s,r
RENTS & LEASING 1 .0000 .0015 -,s,r
WAGE LEVEL 1 .0072 +,s .0065 -,s,r
ENERGY CONSUMPTION 1 .0001 .0033 -,s,r
Outsourcing
MATERIAL INPUTS 1 .0090 +,s,r .0009 -,s,r
EXTERNAL CONTRACT WORK 1 .0004 +,s .0000
EXTERNAL SERVICES 1 .0020 +,s .0017 -,s,r
Product Market
MARKET SHARE 1 .0006 +,s,r .0003 +,s,r
CONCENTRATION 1 .0001 .0001
INDUSTRY 263 .0338 s .0414 s
Organization
SIZE 1 .0016 -,s,r .0006 -,s,r
SIZE*SIZE 1 .0010 +,s .0004 +,s
LEGAL FORM OF BUSINESS 2 .0004 s .0006 s
NUMBER OF OWNERS 9 .0014 s .0034 s
CRAFT/MANUFACTURING 2 .0001 .0008 s
Location Effects:
REGION TYPE 8 .0022 s .0018 s
FEDERAL STATE 15 .0004 s .0009 s
EAST/WEST 1 .0002 s .0011 s
EAST/WEST*YEAR 8 .0013 s .0103 s
YEAR 8 .0073 .0305 s
Obs. 42615 42411
Total R2 .3487 .2059
Notes: Sign before partial R2indicates direction of effect s=signﬁcant at 1%
r=rank-transformation robust. Partial R2>=0 . 0 1a r ep r i n t e db o l d .




(Selected Variables) DF Elasticity1 t-value
Cost and Production
CAPITAL INTENSITY 1 .3810 65.27
RENTS & LEASING 1 -.0022 -0.55
WAGE LEVEL 1 .5193 21.56
ENERGY CONSUMPTION 1 -.0093 -2.23
Outsourcing
MATERIAL INPUTS 1 .1130 24.21
EXTERNAL CONTRACT WORK 1 .0108 5.40
EXTERNAL SERVICES 1 .0681 11.46
Product Market
MARKET SHARE 1 .0124 6.49
CONCENTRATION 1 .0283 1.99
SIZE 1 -.0171 -10.10
SIZE*SIZE 1 .0012 8.17
Obs. 42615
Total R2 .3487
1 At the mean data point.
21Tab. 7: Partial R-Squares From Within-ﬁrms Estimations
Dependent Variable:
Return per Return on
Employee (RPE) Sales (ROS)
DF Part. R2 Notes Part. R2 Notes
Firm-speciﬁc Effects 37961 .4957 s
37932 .6085 s
Cost and Production
CAPITAL INTENSITY 1 .0066 +,s,r .0032 +,s,r
RENTS & LEASING 1 .0009 -,s,r .0012 -,s,r
WAGE LEVEL 1 .0004 +,s,r .0012 -,s,r
ENERGY CONSUMPTION 1 .0004 +,s,r .0000
Outsourcing
MATERIAL INPUTS 1 .0024 +,s,r .0001 +,s
EXTERNAL CONTRACT WORK 1 .0001 +,s .0000
EXTERNAL SERVICES 1 .0007 -,s,r .0019 -,s,r
Product Market
MARKET SHARE 1 .0003 +,s,r .0003 +,s,r
CONCENTRATION 1 .0000 -,s,r .0001 -,s,r
GROWTH OF INDUSTRY SALES 1 .0002 +,s,r .0002 +,s,r
YEAR 8 .0005 s .0005 s
Obs. 143539 143714
Total R2 .7346 .6674
Sign before partial R2indicates direction of effect. s=signﬁcant at 1%
r=rank transformation robust, partial R2>= 0.001 are printed bold.




(Selected Variables) DF Elasticity1 t-value
Cost and Production
CAPITAL INTENSITY 1 .2715 51.34
RENTS & LEASING 1 -.0747 -19.00
WAGE LEVEL 1 .2881 12.44
ENERGY CONSUMPTION 1 .0240 9.25
Outsourcing
MATERIAL INPUTS 1 .1704 31.15
EXTERNAL CONTRACT WORK 1 .0101 5.77
EXTERNAL SERVICES 1 -.0960 -16.45
Product Market
MARKET SHARE 1 .0229 11.50
CONCENTRATION 1 -.0203 -4.17
GROWTH OF INDUSTRY SALES 1 .0049 8.10
Obs. 143539
Total R2 .7346
1 At the mean data point.
23